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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that the law in force at the time of the adoptive parent's death 'determines
the right of an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive parent."a With
this generally accepted rule, together with the legislative intent w hich
may be inferred by the failure to include an express provision making the
act of 1949 prospective only,3 6 it is submitted that the court should con-
sider the law in effect at the time of the death of the adoptive parent as
controlling.37
HARRY E. FAGGART, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Custody Awards of Minor Children-urisdictional
and Full Faith and Credit Requirements
Where a decree awarding custody of a minor child is made in a state
court, and a subsequent modification of that decree is sought in the courts
of another state, two difficult questions are presented to the second court
before it may decide the case on its merits: Is there jurisdiction to make
the custody award, and if so, must full faith and credit be accorded the
decree made by the sister state?
These problems were raised by two recent cases decided by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. In Sadler v. Sadler,' husband and
wife, residents of North Carolina, agreed prior to an extra-legal separa-
tion that neither would take the two minor children out of the state
without notice to the other. The wife took the children to Georgia in
breach of this agreement, and resided there with them. The husband
sued out a writ of habeas corpus in a Georgia court, seeking custody of
the children. On return of the writ, custody was awarded to the wife.
Following this, the husband brought an action for divorce and for cus-
tody of the children2 in the North Carolina Superior Court. The wife
answered, requesting alimony and support for the children. The Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court's award of custody to the husband,
holding that the North Carolina court did not have jurisdiction to render
the decree and that the Georgia decree was entitled to full faith and
credit.
Shortly after the decision in the Sadler case, another facet of this
" See Note, 18 A. L. R. 2d 960, 962. But see Blodgett v. Stowell, 189 Mass. 142,
75 N. E. 138 (1905), where it is held that the effect of the adoption is determined
by the law in force at the time of the adoption.
" The adoption act of 1949 did not contain a provision similar to that found in
the 1941 act that its provisions regarding inheritance applied only to subsequent
adoptions. See note 30 supra.
"See Fairley, Inheritance Rights Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N. C. L. IRv.
227 (1951) who takes the contrary view in interpretation of the present North
Carolina statutes. Of course, if the adoptive parent died between 1941 and 1949
then the provisions of N. C. PuB. LAWS c. 281, §8 (1941), note 30 supra, would
be controlling. See notes 26 and 33 supra.
1234 N. C. 49, 65 S. E. 2d 345 (1951).
-N. C. GEr. STAT. §50-7 (1950).
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problem was presented. In Gafford v. Phelps,3 the husband, wife and
minor child were residents of North Carolina. Following an extra-legal
,separation, the wife went to her native state of Alabama, leaving the
child with the husband in North Carolina. An agreement was entered
into between them whereby each parent was to have custody of the child
for a part of each year. This agreement was subsequently made a part
of an absolute decree of divorce rendered by an Alabama court. This
divorce action was brought by the wife, and the husband was a party,
but the child was not in Alabama at the time of the decree nor for three
years thereafter. In conformance with the decree, the child went to
Alabama for one visit. However, the father refused to allow the mother
to take the child when the time arrived for the second visit. The mother
brought an action in the North Carolina Superior Court for custody of
the child.4 The Supreme Court, in affirming an award of custody to
the father, held that the Alabama decree was not entitled to full faith
and credit. The basis for the court's reasoning was that the child was
not in Alabama at the time of the decree.
The question of jurisdiction of the North Carolina court was not
presented in the Gafford case, as all of the parties were within the juris-
diction of the court, and the father and child were domiciled within the
state. The jurisdiction of the Alabama court was in issue, however, as
the child was not before the court at the time of the decree. Conversely,
in the Sadler case, the jurisdiction of the Georgia court was conceded,
as all of the parties were before that court when the habeas corpus writ
was returned and the mother and child were domiciled in Georgia,5
whereas the jurisdiction of the North Carolina Court was in issue be-
cause the children were not before that court at the time of the hearing.
The question of jurisdiction in custody cases has been the source of
much confusion in the state courts and the United States Supreme
Court has done little to clear up the problem. 6 The majority of states
S235 N. C. 218, - S. E. 2d - (1952).
'N. C. GFN. STAT. §50-13 (1950).
'A married woman may acquire a domicile separate from her husband. Wil-
liamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619 (1913); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562
(1905).
Whether the domicile of the child is that of the father or mother is often a
difficult problem to decide. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that,
"Ordinarily the domicile of an unemancipated child, during its minority, follows
that of the father. However, where parents are separated by judicial decree or
divorce and the custody of a child is awarded to the mother, or where a father
abandons the mother and child, the child's domicile follows that of the mother.
And it should be kept in mind that a child may reside in one place and its domicile
may be in another." Allman v. Register, 233 N. C. 531, 534, 64 S. E. 2d 861, 862
(1951). This problem was not raised by the facts of the Gafford case, but if this
statement be applied to the facts of the Sadler case there is some doubt if the
domicile of the children ever ceased to be that of the father. Quaere?
'In Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610 (1947), the Supreme Court stated that full
faith and credit did not apply if the awarding state had no jurisdiction, but it did
not determine the minimum requirements for jurisdiction. Cf. Williams v. Wil-
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hold that domicile of the child in the state is necessary to give the court
jurisdiction of the cause. 7 North Carolina,8 Georgia0 and Alabama 10
are in this group. The rationale of this rule is that custody is a matter
of status, and a person's status may be changed only at his domicile."
However, custody is not a true change in status, although the authorities
refer to it as such for lack of a more accurate name. The relationship
between custodian and child is more physical than legal; custody awards
are subject to modification, whereas a true change in status effects a
permanent result. 12  However, an award of custody does resemble a
declaration of status in that it is not terminable at the will of the parties.
A few courts require only the residence of the child if one parent is
domiciled in the state;13 others base jurisdiction on mere residence with-
out a finding of domicile. 14 An analysis of these decisions is made diffi-
cult by the frequent interchange of the words "residence" and "domicile"
by the courts. 15
If the state exercises its police power in awarding custody, mere
physical presence of the child in the court is held to be sufficient. Thus,
when an infant is found in the state neglected or without custodian or
liams, 325 U. S. 226 (1945) where domicile of at least one party to the divorce
and other conformance to due process are necessary before the decree will be en-
titled to full faith and credit in a sister state. See Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 214 (1933).
' Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205 285 Pac. 606 (1930) ; Callahan v. Callahan, 296Ky. 444, 177 S. W. 2d 565 (1944); II BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §144.3(1945) ; cf. Burrowes v. Burrowes, 210 N. C. 788, 188 S. E. 648 (1947) (child in
out of state school).
' Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N. C. 218, - S. E. 2d - (1952) ; Sadler v. Sadler,
234 N. C. 49, 65 S. E. 2d 345 (1951) ; Coble v. Coble, 229 N. C. 81, 47 S. E. 2d
798 (1948) ; In re Biggers, 228 N. C. 743, 47 S. E. 2d 32 (1948) ; cf. Burrowes v.
Burrowes, 210 N. C. 788, 188 S. E. 648 (1947).
' Hicks v. Hicks, 193 Ga. 446, 18 S. E. 2d 754 (1942).
10 In Lynn v. Wright, 34 Ala. App. Div. 492, 496, 42 So. 2d 484 (1949), on
facts almost identical with those in the Gafford case, the Alabama Court of Ap-
peals, quoting from II BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §144.3 (1945), expressly
held that physical presence of the child was necessary to the jurisdiction of a court
rendering a custody award. This decision was reversed and remanded to the court
of appeals on another ground by the Alabama Supreme Court in 252 Ala. 106, 42
So. 2d 489 (1949). Following this, certiorari was sought of the Alabama Supreme
Court on the jurisdictional question herein discussed. In denying certiorari the
court stated that the ruling upon jurisdiction "may be sound," but even if not, the
change in circumstances would justify a new award of custody. 252 Ala. 606, 42
So. 2d 490 (1949). Cf. Long v. Long, 239 Ala. 156, 194 So. 190 (1940).
" RESTATEMENT, CoNrLICr OF LAWS §§54, 117, 119, 145, 146 (1934) ; Goodrich,
Cwstody of Children in Divorce Sits, 7 CORNELL L. Q. 1 (1921).
"
2 Note, 2 UTAH L. R. 70 (1951).
1" Coin. ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 AtI. 524 (1930), 78 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 1023; cf. Milner v. Gatlin, 139 Ga. 109, 76 S. E. 860 (1912) senble.
1 De La Montanya v. De La. Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896);
Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N. E. 395 (1930); Sheehy v Sheehy, 88
N. H. 223, 186 AtI. 1 (1936); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624(1925); Note, 47 MicH L. REv. 970 (1933).
" e De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896)(dissenting opinion) ; Note, 2 ARK. L. REv. 78 (1949).
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guardian, the state has sufficient interest to award temporary custody.' 6
A substantial number of courts hold that personal jurisdiction over
both parents in a divorce suit is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction
to award custody of the children.1 7 This is true even if the children are
not domiciled in the state nor before the court. A theory of parental
right forms the basis of these decisions rather than the theory of status.' 8
As the parents are within the court's jurisdiction, the children are also
said to be before the court. This view has the practical advantage of
avoiding a subsequent suit to determine custody. As the award is based
on the best interests of the child, the most convenient time to award
custody would seem to be when the parties, whose relative qualities are
to be considered, are before the court.
If the court finds that it has jurisdiction to award custody, the second
question presented is, would a decree modifying a previous award made
by a sister state violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion? The Supreme Court has held that full faith and credit is required
only to the extent of finality accorded the decree in the awarding state. 19
A majority of states follow the rule that a custody award is not binding
in that state if subsequent events have altered the original circum-
stances.2 0 The award is predicated on the best interest of the child,
consequently a subsequent change in circumstances may justify a modi-
fication of the original decree. 21 Thus, there is no violation of the full
faith and credit requirement when a court of one state, on the basis of
altered conditions, modifies the decree of another state which follows
this majority rule. A few courts have modified decrees rendered by
courts of other states without a showing of a change in circumstances, 22
the theory being that the domicile has sufficient interest in the welfare
"0 Hartman v. Henry, 280 Mo. 478, 217 S. W. 987 (1920). See Note, 81 U. OF
PA. L. RFv. 970 (1933).17 Stephens v. Stephens, 53 Idaho 427, 24 P. 2d 52 (1933) ; Wilson v. Wilson,
66 Nev. 405, 212 P. 2d 1066 (1949) ; Payton v. Payton, 26 N. M. 618, 225 Pac. 576(1924) ; cf. Crummer v. Crummer, 283 Ill. App. 220 (1935).
"
8 Fagan v. Fagan, 131 Conn. 688, 42 A. 2d 41 (1945) ; See, May v. May, 233
App. Div. 519, 253 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1st Dept. 1931).
" U. S. Const. Art. IV, §1; 28 U. S. C. §687; Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610(1947); 15 BROOKLYN L. REv. 290 (1949). See Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall.
457 (U. S. 1874) where jurisdiction of a state court rendering a judgment wasinquired into in a subsequent action in another state on the judgment.
20 Com. ex. rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 Ati. 524 (1930) ; RESTATE-
mENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §147 (1934); GOODRICH, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §136(3d ed. 1949).
"These courts have a very liberal interpretation of what constitutes a substan-
tial change. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintainance Across State Lines, 10
LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 819 (1944). In Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77
At. 1 (1910) the court said on this point: ". . . it follows that the recognition
extra-territorially which custody orders will receive or can command is liable to
be more theoretical than of great practical importance."
2-lit re Bort, 25 Kan. 308, 37 Am. Rep. 255 (1881) ; fi re Alderman; 157 N. C.
507, 73 S. E. 126 (1911) ; Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of
Laws, 8 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 42 (1940).
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of the child to override any former adjudication of the question in a sister
state. If the court has personal jurisdiction over the child, his interests
are deemed to be paramount to any claims between the parents. 23 Simi-
larly, a few courts have made a decision on the facts before them, as-
suming without actually determining, that the facts in the prior case
were different.2 4
In some states an award granted in a habeas corpus proceeding is
not binding upon a court of that state having jurisdiction of a subsequent
divorce suit.25 Both the Georgia and the North Carolina courts follow
this rule, basing their conclusion on the fact that statutes expressly con-
fer jurisdiction to determine custody in divorce proceedings. Habeas
corpus is a proper remedy to determine custody only as between husband
and wife, therefore the writ is improper when custody is sought in a
subsequent divorce suit.2 6
In the Sadler case the court accorded full faith and credit to the
Georgia decree, and stated that it was without jurisdiction to make a
valid order affecting custody as long as the children were in Georgia.
It would seem that no question of full faith and credit was presented, for
if the court was without jurisdiction to make any award, full faith and
credit is immaterial. If the court had jurisdiction, then full faith and
credit is due only to the extent the award was valid in Georgia. As the
award would not be binding in Georgia in a subsequent divore pro-
ceeding,2 7 the North Carolina court was not required to accord full faith
and credit. The court's decision that it lacked jurisdiction because the
children were not domiciled in North Carolina is in accord with prior
North Carolina cases.28 However, the more convenient procedure would
seem to be to take jurisdiction and decide the question while both parents
are before the court.29 Thus, had the court followed this rule as to
jurisdiction, it could have decided the issue of custody of the children
without violating the full faith and credit clause.
On the other hand, the Gafford decision was based upon the lack of
jurisdiction of the Alabama court to render a decree of custody as the
child was not before that court. Since Alabama follows the majority
3 The welfare of the child seems to be paramount to any consideration of full
faith and credit due a foreign decree. These courts have simply said full faith and
credit did not apply in these cases, however such holdings are rare. See Stumberg,
supra note 22.
"Ex parte Erving, 109 N. J. Eq. 294, 157 At. 161 (Ch. 1931), 32 COL. L. REv.
385 (1932).2 Langon v. Langon, 150 F. 2d 979 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Zachry v. Zachry, 40
Ga. 479, 79 S. E. 115; It re King, 66 Kan. 695, 72 Pac. 263 (1903) ; Comack v?
Marshall, 211 Ill. 519, 71 N. E. 1077 (1904) ; Ex parte Fuller, 58 Tex. Civ. App.
217, 123 S. W. 204 (1909) ; Note, 34 GEo. L. 3. 105 (1945).
" N. C. Gsa. STAT. §50-13 (1950) ; Robbins v. Robbins, 229 N. C. 430, 50 S. E.
2d 183 (1948) ; GA. CODE §§30-127, 37-122 (1945), Ponder v. Ponder, 198 Ga. 781,
32 S. E. 2d 801 (1945).
2 See note 26 supra. 28 See note 8 supra.
2, See notes 17 and 18 supra.
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rule in requiring domicile of the child as a prerequisite to jurisdiction,
the decision does no violence to the full faith and credit requirement.30
Even if Alabama followed the rule suggested above, not requiring the
domicile of the child if both parents are before the court, the result in the
Gafford case probably would have been the same. The facts indicated
sufficient change in condition to have warranted a new custody award.
Thus, in each of these cases the court consistently applies its rule
that presence of the child is necessary to jurisdiction for an award of
custody, and indicated the limits of the full faith and credit requirement
in such cases.
0. E. Ross, III.
Constitutional Law-Use of Stomach Pump-Denial of Due Process
"Evidence forcibly extracted from the stomach of a prisoner may not
be used validly to convict him of a crime, the Supreme Court ruled today.
Such procedure, it held, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' The American public was thus informed by the press
of the decision in the case of Rochin v. People of California.2  Several
state law enforcement officers, without a search warrant, forced their
way into the room in which the defendant had been sleeping, acting on
information that defendant had narcotics in his possession. Upon their
entry defendant swallowed two capsules which had been laying on a
night stand. Following a struggle in which the officers were unable to
force him to expel the evidence they handcuffed the defendant, took him
to a hospital and after strapping him to an operating table, forced a
stomach pump down his throat and retrieved the capsules. On this
evidence defendant was convicted and sentenced, and the California
Supreme Court denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the conviction, however, without unanimity of
opinion as to the reasons for the reversal. The majority held that through
their actions the state officers had denied defendant due process of law.
Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in the reversal, felt that this was
too nebulous a standard, and that the specific point involved was that
the defendant had been forced to give testimony against himself, thus
denying him the protection of the Fifth Amendment.3
" See note 10 supra.
However, the court did not look to the Alabama cases to determine the juris-
diction of the Alabama court. Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N. C. 218, 222, - S. E. 2d
- (1952). This does not seem to conform with accepted principles of conflict of
laws. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§7, 8 (1934).
1 N. Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1952, §1, p. 1, col. 6.
"The Supreme Court struck out today at the forcible use of a stomach pump to
get narcotics evidence, denouncing such police methods as akin to the old-time rack
and screw." Raleigh (N. C.) News and Observer, Jan. 3, 1952, §1, p. 1, col. 6.
See Time, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 22, col. 1, story entitled, "Freedom of the Stomach."
2 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952).
Rochin v. People of California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 211 (1952).
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